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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

Case No. 970174

:

JEFFREY EARL SOUTH, and

:

DIANNA SOUTH,

:

Defendants/Petitioners.

Priority No. 12

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals properly determine that a clerical error in a search

warrant does not automatically render the warrant invalid where the warrant explicitly
incorporates the supporting affidavit and that affidavit not only requests permission to search the
area that was searched but also plainly establishes probable cause to search the area in dispute?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The State relies on no constitutional provisions or statutes. The State relies on the
following court rule:
Utah R. App. P. 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons.
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the

Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on
the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision;
or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question
of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
OPINION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
The opinion that petitioners ask this Court to review is State v. Soyth 932 P.2d 622
(Utah App. 1997) (hereinafter "South HI"), a copy of which is attached as addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Detective Dennis Simonson of the Logan Police Department went to the petitioners'
home to investigate the reported theft of a cellular phone. Upon his arrival, the detective smelled
the heavy odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the petitioners' home and from Jeffrey South's
clothing. South TTT. 932 P.2d at 623.
Simonson obtained a search warrant to search the persons present at the petitioners'
home and the home itself. While the supporting affidavit made clear that permission to search the
petitioners' home had been requested, the warrant itself authorized a search of "the persons of

2

JEFFREY AND DIANNA SOUTH" and other persons located at petitioners' home. LL at 62324. The warrant then provided the street address of petitioners' home and a description of its
appearance. Simonson, accompanied by several other officers, conducted a search of petitioners'
residence. The officers found controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. I$L
Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence seized from their home on the ground that
the warrant authorized only a search of their persons, not their residence. The trial court
determined that the warrant "through inadvertence" failed to authorize a search of petitioners'
home and was therefore invalid. It nonetheless denied the motion to suppress on the ground that
the search was proper under the plain smell exception to the warrant requirement. Following their
convictions, petitioners appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding that the search was proper
under the plain smell exception. State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah App. 1994)
(hereinafter "SQUtLT). After refusing to consider the State's alternative argument for affirming
petitioners' convictions - that the warrant was valid despite its technical defect - the Court of
Appeals reversed petitioners' convictions. IJL at 795-97. The State sought and obtained certiorari
review on the question of whether the Court of Appeals improperly refused to consider its
alternative ground for affirmance.

This Court determined the Court of Appeals erred and

remanded the case for consideration of whether the search could be supported based on the
warrant. State V, South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) (hereinafter "South TTY
In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals determined that the "clerical error" that
resulted in the omission of petitioners' home from the warrant did not invalidate the warrant
because the "warrant specifically referred to and incorporated Detective Simonson's affidavit,
3

which was submitted to and signed by the judge issuing the warrant.* South in. 932 P.2d at 625.
Because the affidavit established probable cause to believe controlled substances were located at
petitioners' home, sought permission to search petitioners' home, and was signed by the issuing
magistrate, the Court of Appeals determined that the warrant was intended to authorize a search
of petitioners' home. LL at 6256-26. Because the officers executing the search warrant "were
able to identify the area to be searched with reasonable effort," the Court of Appeals deemed the
search of petitioners' home proper. IdL Petitioners now seek certiorari review of that ruling.
ARGUMENT
THE OPINION BELOW DOES NOT MERIT CERTIORARI
REVIEW BECAUSE IT IS FACT SENSITIVE AND WAS
RESOLVED UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF
LAW PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT
A writ of certiorari "will be granted only for special and important reasons." Utah
R. App. P. 46. It is clear from the illustrative categories identified in subsections (a) through (d)
of the rule that the purpose of certiorari is not to have the Supreme Court to sit as a court of
ultimate error-correction, but rather to address significant legal questions of wide application.
Petitioners' challenge to the opinion below presents no such question. Their claims are fact
specific and have no continuing importance beyond this case.
Petitioners do not allege that the Court of Appeals' opinion is in conflict with
prevailing case law or that the court misread any opinion upon which it based its decision. In
sum, petitioners do not question the Court of Appeals' interpretation of existing case law, they
simply disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the search of their home was supported
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by a duly issued search warrant which, though technically flawed, was intended to authorize a
search of their residence.
As the Court of Appeals emphasized, this Court has made clear that "technical
deficiencies in a search warrant's description of the place to be searched do not necessarily
invalidate the warrant."

SQUHLHI,

932 P.2d at 624 (citing State v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385, 392

(Utah 1986); State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985); State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d
970, 972-73 (Utah App. 1989)). Rather, the requirement that a search warrant "particularly
describe" the person or place to be searched is satisfied "if the description is such that the officer
with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended [to be
searched]."

SQUULHL

932 P.2d at 624 (quoting Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102. (quoting in turn

Steele v. United States. 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1925))). Where a search warrant
specifically refers to the affidavit in support of the petition for a warrant, it is appropriate to
consider the affidavit in determining whether the warrant sufficiently identified the place intended
to be search. South m. 932 P.2d at 625 (citing Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102). Factors to
consider include whether the affidavit demonstrated that the officer had probable cause to search
the area in question and whether a warrant to search the area was requested. I$L (citing
Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102-03). Whether the affiant completed or participated in executing the
search should also be considered. LL
In this case, it is undisputed that a clerical error resulted in the omission of permission
to search petitioners' home from the warrant even though the home was identified in the warrant
by its street address and a detailed description. South m. 932 P.2d at 625. The affidavit
supporting the search warrant established probable cause to search petitioners' home, and
5

permission to search the home was in fact requested.

I$L Finally, Detective Simonson

participated in the execution of the search warrant and it is undisputed the officers were able to
identify the area to be search with reasonable effort as evidenced by the fact that they in fact
searched petitioners' home and not some other location. I$L
Perhaps most importantly, the issuing magistrate signed the affidavit supporting the
search warrant. IJL By signing an affidavit that established probable cause to search petitioners'
residence and requested permission to do so, the issuing magistrate evidenced an intent to
authorize a search of petitioners' home. I$L The mere fact that a "clerical error" resulted in the
warrant being poorly worded does not invalidate the warrant. Instead, relying on well-established
case law from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
properly determined that the warrant, though flawed, was not invalid. The supporting affidavit,
which was incorporated into the warrant by reference, made clear that petitioners' house was
within the scope of the search warrant. I$L
The unusual facts of this case are not likely to recur. More importantly, the legal
principles for resolving this case and those of a similar ilk have already been well-defined by this
Court and the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, the likelihood that this Court's analysis of
the facts presented would differ from that provided by the Court of Appeals is virtually nil.

6

Because review of the opinion below will not significantly enhance the development of law,
certiorari review is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the writ should not issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / g ^ f c y of May, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

TODD A. UTZpraj
Assistant Attorney^General
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed by first class mail this / ^ t B y of May, 1997 to
the following:
DIANNA SOUTH
237 East 200 North
Logan, Utah 84321
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Motison court did not precisely describe
what action, if any, the sentencing trial court
took in regard to restitution. Monson *s language accords the Board broad authority to
order restitution as a condition of parole
under both the Utah Constitution and statutory provisions." I agree that Man son does
not reveal the sentencing trial court's action,
if any, taken in regard to restitution. As a
result, I do not believe that the Board's
authority under Monson extends, for example, to a circumstance where the trial court
made *n affirmative ruling on restitution.
As noted in Stilling v. Utah Board of
Pardon*. 950818, — P.2d
(Utah App.
Jan. 24, 2997) (Davis, P.J.. concurring in
remit) "where the criminal trial court has
failed lo meet its statutorily imposed judicial
duty to address restitution at the time of
sentencing, the Board does not*violate the
separation of powers provision of the Utah
Constitution by imposing restitution as a condition of parole." Id at 9-10. at
;
see r//v; Utah Const, art. V, § 1 HNJo
person charged with the exercise of powers
proper 1\ belonging to [one of the three distinct branches of government], shall exercise
any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.").
As in Stilling, this case does not involve an
instance in which the Board is imposing a
condition of restitution on an inmate's parole
in direct contravention to a sentencing
court's affirmative determination to the contrary. Although the parties recommended
that petitioner receive no prison time and
that no restitution be ordered, the record
does not reveal that the trial court made an
affirmative determination not to order restitution. Indeed, the trial court affirmatively
rejected the parties' recommendations with
reference to prison and made no restitution
determination under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (3)(b) (1S90) (current
version at Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (8)(a)(d) (Supp.1996)); see oho State v. Ha$ton>
811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App.1991) (discussing mandatory requirement that restitution
be addressed on record at time of sentencing), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1993). As a result, it was appropriate

for the Board to order restitution in this cas<
notwithstanding Momon.
However, because the Monson restitutio!
analysis does not address separation of pow
ers, I believe it is inappropriate to assunn
the Utah Supreme Court had before it a casi
in which the sentencing court explicitly rule*
on the restitution issue. Also, because thi
Monson court did not consider separation u
powers, it is inappropriate to presume th4:
the supreme court vested the Board wit
over broad authority to order restitution as ,
parole condition, and the facts of this case d
not require such an expansive interpretation
of Monson. Accordingly, inasmuch as th
majority opinion interprets Monson as al
fording the Board broad authority in orde»
ing parole conditions, without extending *h,
interpretation to instances where the tris
court expressly considered restitutio!] at th
time of sentencing, I concur.

( O f <l>NUM6t*S>SUM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Jeffery Earl SOUTH and Dianna South
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 930362-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 30, 1997.
Defendants were convicted in the Fir
Circuit Court, Cache County, Burton H H^
lis, J., of possession of a controlled substan
and possession of drug paraphernalia with
1000 feet of a church, and they appealc
The Court of Appeals. 885 P.2d 795. v
versed, and state petitioned for writ of certi
rari. The Supreme Court, 924 P.2d 3"
reversed and remanded. On remand, t
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held th;
(1) police officers did not exceed scope
search warrant when they searched deft
dants' residence pursuant to wanaiu autr
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rizing search of "the person of defendants,
but (2) distance element of statute providing
heightened sentence for drug-related crimes
committed within 1000 feet of a church was
element of underlying drug offenses that
state was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
1. Drugs and Narcotics ^lSSKU
Police officers did not exceed scope of
search warrant when they searched defendants' residence pursuant to warrant authorizing search of "the person of" defendants,
where search warrant affidavit stated that
police officer had probable cause to suspect
presence of controlled substance at defendants' address, warrant expressly incorporated affidavit, and affiant was among officers
executing warrant. U.S.CA. ConstAmend.
4.
2. Drugs and Narcotics <3=>133
Distance element of statute providing
heightened sentence for drug-related crimes
committed within 1000 feet of a church was
element of underlying drug offenses that
state was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt. U.C A.1953, 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix).
Kathryn D. Kendell, American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc., Salt
Lake City, and Nathan Hult, Logan, for Defendants and Appellants.
Jan Graham, Attorney General, and Todd
A. Utzinger, Assistant Attorney, Salt Lake
City, and Gary O. McKean, Cache County
Attorney, Jeffrey "Rw Burbank and Patrick
B. Nolan, Cache Deputy County Attorneys,
Logan, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Before DAVIS, PJ., and BENCH and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
The State seeks affirmance of the convictions of Jeffery Earl and Diknna South of
possession of a controlled substance within

1000 feet of a church, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 and 5837a-5 (1994), on the ground that the trial
court erred in concluding the search of the
Souths' home exceeded the scope of the
search warrant. The trial court determined
that the search executed exceeded the warrant's scope because the warrant permitted
only a search of "the person of Jeffery and
Dianna South," and not a search of their
personal residence. However, the trial court
upheld the search on other grounds. Defendants challenge the trial court's imposition of
an enhanced sentence. We affirm the convictions, but reverse and remand in regard to
the sentence enhancements.
BACKGROUND
This case is before us on remand from the
Utah Supreme Court. State v. South, 92A
?2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996). The criminal
charges against the Souths arose out of a
search warrant executed on March 15, 1992,
by Detective Dennis Simonson of the Logan
City Police Department. Initially, Detective
Simonson visited defendants' personal residence to investigate the reported theft of a
cellular phone. Upon arrival, Detective Simonson smelled a heavy odor of burnt marijuana emanating from defendants* home and
from Jeffery South's clothing.
Detective Simonson proceeded to obtain a
search warrant, which authorized a search of
"the persons of Jeffery Earl and Dianna
South." The search warrant specifically referenced a supporting affidavit that explicitly
referenced a search of defendants' personal
residence. Detective Simonson served the
search warrant upon defendants and with the
assistance of several other officers, commenced a search of the South residence.
The officers found controlled substances and
drug paraphernalia.
Defendants were subsequently charged
with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia within 1000
feet of a church. Prior to trial, defendants
moved to suppress the evidence found in
their residence, claiming it was seized in an
illegal search and seizure. Defendants as-

624

Utah

932 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

serted that the search warrant was detective
because it authorized only a search of the
"persons of Jeffery Earl and Dianna South,"
and not of their personal residence. In denying defendants' motion to suppress, the
trial court ruled that although the search
warrant was defective, the evidence was admissible under the plain smell doctrine.1.
Defendants were adjudged guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. At sentencing,
the trial court determined that the possession of a controlled substance offense was
committed within 1000 feet of a church, in
this instance, the Logan Temple of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Defendants then appealed to this court.

See State it I'ena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah
1994). We will overturn the trial court V
underlying factual findings only if those findings are clearly erroneous. Id at 939 n. 4

1. See. e.g.. State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969. 972
(Utah App.1992) (upholding warrantless search
of vehicle where plain smell of marijuana gave
officers probable cause).

3. The current version of this section is substantially the same as that in effect at the time this
issue arose. The 1994 amendment, effective May
2. 1994. made merely minor stylistic changes.

ANALYSIS
I. Validity of Search Executed

[1] A search warrant must "particularly
describe!) the person or place to be searched
and the person, property, or evidence to be
seized." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-203 (1995)
(emphasis added)/* The particularity requirement is satisfied " 'if the description is
such that the officer with a search warrant
can tvith reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.' " State v. Anderson,
We declined to apply the plain smell doc- 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) (quoting
trine to personal residences and determined Steele v. United States, 2G7 U.S. 498, 503, 45
that a warrant was required to search defen- S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925)). This
dants' home and that exigent circumstances reading of the particularity requirement profor a warrantless search were not present. tects two concerns. First, it promotes the
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795. 799-800 (Utah deterrence of " 'general, exploratory rumApp.1994). We further declined to address maging in a person's belongings.'" Andrethe State's alternative ground for affirmance, sex v. Maryland. 427 U.S. 463, 480, % S.Ct.
scope of the search warrant, because the 2737, 274<S, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976) (quoting
State had failed to cross-appeal this issue, Cooltdge r. Xcic Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443.
and reversed defendants' convictions. Id. at 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038. 29 L.Ed.2d 564
798.
(1971)). Second, the scope of the lawful
search
is limited to " 'the places in which
The State then petitioned for and was
there
is
probable cause to believe that it [the
granted a writ of certiorari by the Utah
evidence]
may be found."* Maryland v.
Supreme Court. See Stole v. South 924 P.2d
Garrison
480
U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013,
354 (Utah 1996). The supreme court held
1016,
94
L.Ed2d
72 (1937) (quoting United
that even though the State did not crossStates
v.
Ross,
456
U.S. 798. 824, 102 S.Ct.
appeal the validity of the search, this court,
2157.
2172,
72
L.Eci.2d
572 (19*2)).
should have considered that alternative
ground for affirmance of the convictions beUtah courts have held that technical defilow, which the State had argued in its brief ciencies in a search warrant's description of
to this court.2 The supreme court remanded the place to be searched do not necessarily
the case to this court to determine the law- invalidate the warrant. E.g., State v. Kelly,
fulness of the search under the warrant.
718 P2d 3S5, 392 (Utah 1986) (holding warrant and search valid where one of number of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
warrants contained incorrect street number
We review for correctness the trial court's because correct address appeared on atlegal conclusions on motions to suppress. tached affidavit as well as other related war-

2. The supreme court did not address the applicability of the plain smell doctrine to personal
residences.
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rants and affidavits); Anderson, 701 P.2d at
1103; State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972-73
(Utah App.1989) (holding affidavit clarified
ambiguity that both residence and blue trailer, not just residence, as described in search
warrant, were proper subjects of search). In
Anderson, an informant told a police officer
that defendant's property contained a fenced
area used for cultivating maryuana. 701
P.2d at 1100. The officer obtained a search
warrant that authorized the search of defendant's "residence." Id The warrant, however, made no reference to the fenced enclosure, which was located about 100 feet north
of defendant's house. Id at 1100, 1102. In
executing the search warrant, the police
searched only the enclosed area, where they
discovered over 100 marijuana plants. Id at
1100. Defendant argued that the search exceeded the warrant's scope. Id at 1102.
In considering the warrant's scope, the
supreme court emphasized that the warrant
specifically referred to the affidavit in support of the petition for a warrant. Id The
affidavit clearly showed that the officer had
probable cause to search the enclosed area,
and that he had requested a warrant to
search that specific area. Id at 1102-03.
Finally, the affiant was the very officer who
executed the search warrant Id at 1103.
Relying on case law that also considered
these factors, the court concluded:
We find this logic persuasive because it
limits the search to the confines contemplated by the magistrate authorizing the
warrant, while not invalidating searches
because of minor technical deficiencies in
the warrant's description Because the
area searched (the enclosure) was the area
for which probable cause had been made
out, and the affidavit adequately identified
that area, the search was valid.
Id (emphasis added).
In this case, a clerical error resulted in the
omission of defendants' home from the warrant's description. Defendants argue that
this omission is more than a mere technical
deficiency. Defendants' argument is unpersuasive, however, as this court has, relying
on Anderson, upheld the search of a house
and trailer where the warrant omitted any
reference to the house itself. Mclntire, 768

P.2d at 972-73 (relying on supporting affidavit to clarify proper scope of search); see
also State u Kleinberg, 22S Neb. 128, 421
N.W.2d 450, 451-55 (1988) (relying on supporting affidavit to uphold search despite
warrant's inadvertent identification of defendant, rather than defendant's automobile, as
subject of search).
The evidence in this case demonstrates
that the officers executing the warrant "were
able to identify the area to be searched with
reasonable effort." Mclntire, 768 P.2d at
973. The warrant specifically referred to
and incorporated Detective Simonson's affidavit, which was submitted to and signed by
the judge issuing the warrant. In particular,
the warrant stated that probable cause to
search was "more fully set forth in the affidavit, a copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herewith." Although the record suggests that, at the time of the search,
the affidavit was not attached to the warrant,
Mclntire requires only that the warrant specifically refer to the affidavit. Id; see also
United States u Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1291
(7th Cir.) (upholding warrant "when an affidavit attached to the warrant or incorporated
into it provides the necessary specificity"),
cert denied, — U.S.
, 116 S.Ct. 263,133
L.Ed.2d 186 (1995); People v. Papez, 652
P.2d 619, 622 (Colo.App.1982) (stating federal
constitution does not require attachment of
affidavit).
Furthermore, the affidavit clearly stated
that Detective Simonson had probable cause
to suspect the presence of controlled substances "at the premises of 237 East 200
North, Logan, Utah," defendants' address.
Based on this probable cause, the affidavit
specifically supported a warrant to search
defendants' home. Therefore, in signing the
affidavit and search warrant, the magistrate
must have determined that Detective Simonson had probable cause for the search of
defendants' home. See Anderson, 701 P.2d
at 1102; Mclntire, 768 V2A at 972-73; see
also United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733,
759 (2d Cir.1984) (stating that one objective
of particularity requirement is to prevent
"seizure of objects upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrate's authorization"), cert denied, 470 U.S.
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1084, 105 S.Ct 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985);
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5,
at 513 (3d ed.1996) (noting that particularity
requirement reduces risk that police will
"search a place other than the place intended
by the magistrate"). The probable cause in
this case was "particularized" to include not
only defendants' person, but also their home.
Cf. State t\ Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah
App.1988), cert., denied, 773 P2d 45 (Utah
1989).

search defendants' home. Thus, with reasc
able effort, any other officer could have c
termined through reviewing the supportii
documents that defendants' home was su
ject to the warrant. Cf. Buckner v. Unit
Suites, 615 A.2d 1154, 1156 (D.C.App.l9S
(relying on facts not specified in either wa
rant or affidavit, but known to officers ex
cuting warrant).

Defendants contend, however, that any
other officer besides the affiant could not
have ascertained with reasonable effort that
defendants' home was subject to the warrant.
Defendants fail to recognize that the warrant
expressly incorporated the affidavit, in which
Detective Simonson had clearly established
probable cause and requested a warrant to

Ann. § 58-37-8(5Ka)(L\) (Supp.1993), which
provides a heightened sentence for certain
drug-related crimes committed within 1000
feet of a church, acts as an element of their
offenses. Defendants further argue that the
State failed to present evidence regarding
this element at trial. The State responds
that this provision constitutes a sentencing

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Cou
has stated that "[t]he adequacy of a descri]
In addition, because the officers limited tion in a search warrant depends in evei
their search to defendants' person and home, instance upon the particular facts of tl
as contemplated by the search warrant and case." Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102; see ah
supporting affidavit, their search did not ex- Mclntire, 768 P.2d at 972. In noting th;
ceed the magistrate's authorization. See the affiant in Anderson had executed th
Anderson 701 P.2d at 1102. Therefore, "the warrant, the supreme court emphasized th
area searched ... was the area for which importance of the actual circumstances sui
probable cause had been made out." Id, at rounding the search, rather than hypothetic,
1103; see also State v. Nicholson, 174 Wis.2d possibilities. 701 P.2d at 1102-03; see ah
542, 497 N.W.2d 791, 794 (1993) (upholding Stale v. Bokan. 72 Wash.App. 335, 864 P.2
search as "tailored to the justification offered 26, 28 (1993) (stating that proper test it
in the warrant" where search "focused on "given the actual facts of a given case, ca
[defendant's] apartment, the very premises the officer who actually executes the warran
which the officers sought judicial permission by reasonable effort find and determine
to search").
proper subject of search "without having t<
Finally. Detective Simonson, the affiant in resort to guess work"), rev. denied. 12
this case, was among the officers who execut- Wash.2d 1002, 877 P.2d 1287 (1994).
ed the warrant. Detective Simonson had
In conclusion, the police established proba
acquired probable cause, prepared the affidable
cause to search defendants' home, when
vit, submitted the affidavit to the judge for
the
evidence was seized, and the affidavit
issuance of the warrant, and executed the
bearing
the signature of the judge, clearh
warrant. See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102identified
their home as a proper subject o
03; Mclutire, 768 P.2d at 972-73; see also
the
search.
Therefore, under Utah law, the
United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490,
1499 (6th Cir.) (upholding search because search executed was valid. The trial couri
"affiant who describe[d] the property to the properly denied defendants' motion to supjudge" was among executing officers), cert press the marijuana and drug paraphernalia
denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S.Ct. 3242, 106 found in their home because the evidence
L.Ed.2d 590 (1989); Stale v. Pruitt, 97 Ohio was not seized in an illegal search and seiApp.3d 258, 646 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1994) (up- zure.
holding search where same officer "both apII. Sentencing Provision
plied for and executed the warrant, thus
rendering a mistaken search unlikely").
[2] Defendants contend that Utah Code
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ncement, not an element of the offense
the State must prove at trial.
ds court has recently held that the provi5 of section 58-37-8(5) constitute an addiil element for the underlying offenses, to
letermined by the trier of fact at trial.
e v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 150 (Utah
1.1996); see also State v. Stromberg, 783
I 54, 60 (Utah App.1989) (identifying
0-feet provision as an "additional elelt" of crime), cert denied, 795 F2d 1138
ah 1990). Therefore, the State had the
•den to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
distance element under section 58-37)(a)(ix). At trial, the State failed to offer
dence regarding the distance between deidants' home and the Logan Temple. Acrdingly, defendants' sentences under this
ovision should be reversed and the matter
manded to the trial court for resentencing.
Under State v Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1211
(Utah 1993), appellate courts "may enter judgment on a lesser included offense when an error

CONCLUSION
We reverse defendants' convictions for
possession of a controlled substance within
1000 feet of a church; affirm the convictions
for possession of drug paraphernalia; enter
judgments of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance;4 and remand the case
to the trial court to impose sentences for the
controlled substance convictions.
DAVIS, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur.
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has tainted the conviction for the greater offense "

